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INTRODUCTION

In substantive criminal law, the highlight of 1979 was the
decision of Leech v. American Booksellers Association,' which
declared the Tennessee Obscenity Act of 1978' unconstitutional.' The Tennessee courts also made an effort to clarify the
confused parameters of the kidnaping statute.' The Tennessee
Supreme Court attacked the age-old quandary whether a person
can be guilty of attempting to receive stolen property if the
property received is not stolen.
The Supreme Court of the United States handed down several significant fourth amendment decisions involving vehicle
stops,7 temporary field detentions,' probable cause,' vehicle

1. This survey encompasses decisions reported in the National Reporter
System and selected unreported cases decided during 1979.
2. 682 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1979).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3001 to -3038 (Supp. 1978) (current version at
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3001 to -3016 (Supp. 1980)).
4. See text accompanying notes 86-129 infra.
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2601 (1975).
6. Bandy v. State, 575 S.W.2d 278 (Tenn. 1979). See text accompanying
notes 74-81 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 130-36 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 137-48 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 149-54 infra.
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searches, 0 standing," and the fruits of an illegal arrest." Tennessee courts continued to shed more heat than light on the status of the open fields exception to the search warrant requirement.'5 Both the United States and Tennessee Supreme Courts
made significant pronouncements concerning the rights of
juveniles who make incriminating statements.' 4
II. OFFENSES
A.

Homicide

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals examined the circumstances in which self-defense properly may be pleaded in
Kennamore v. State. 5 The accused had been injured seriously
when struck on the head with a bottle by the victim. The accused then beat the victim into submission, ran to his truck to
get his shotgun, and fatally shot the victim. The accused maintained that he could not see well because of the injury and fired
because he believed the victim was advancing upon him. Following a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, the accused appealed a denial of a self-defense instruction to the effect that if
the defendant was without fault, was in a place he had a right to
be, and was placed in reasonable apparent danger of losing his
life, "he need not retreat, but may stand his ground, and repel
force by force.""' The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and acknowledged that there was no duty
to retreat from one's home, but maintained that "the linchpin,
of self-defense is the necessity to kill at the time the act is carried out.""' The court quoted as good law Nelson v. State," a
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Feb. 15,
appeals'
16.
Feb. 15,
17.
18.

See
See
See
See
See

text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

186-205 infra.
206-15 infra.
155-61 infra.
174-85 infra.
244-66 in/ra.
TENN. ATT'¥ GEN. ABsTRAcT, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 7-8 (Tenn. Grim. App.
1979). The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the court of criminal
decision in 604 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1980).
T NN. ATrTy. GEN. ABSTRACr, Vol, V, No. 2, p. 7 (Tenn. Grim. App.
1979).
Id. at 7-8.
32 Tenn. 237, 2 Swan 139 (1852).
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pre-Civil War case which held that to be entitled to plead selfdefense, a defendant" 'must give back to the wall.' "9 The Kennamore court held that "[tjhe rule does not permit the taking of
human life to prove one to be a 'true man' nor to preserve one's
pride or vindicate a wrong ....

The 'true man doctrine' places

barbaric emphasis on manliness unleavened by a proper sensitivity to the value of human life."' 0 While rejecting the true man
notion, Judge Byers dissented and maintained that the applicability of self-defense should not be affected by whether the accused retreated.' 1
B. Kidnaping
The crime of kidnaping is committed by "[a]ny person who
forcibly or unlawfully confines, inveigles, or entices away another, with the intent to cause him to be secretly confined, or
imprisoned against his will, or to be sent out of the state against
his will."" Confusion has resulted from this statutory definition
because, while ostensibly codifying the common-law crime of
kidnaping, the statute included false imprisonment as well. At
common law, kidnaping was defined as forcibly abducting a person and sending him or her to another country.23 The crime is
not complete unless there is an asportation of the victim-' Although in Brown v. State 5 the Tenessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that secrecy is also an element of the common-law
offense, this is less than clear. Professor Perkins notes that secrecy is "common in kidnaping,"" but he does not go so far as to
label it an element. Professor Anderson does not discuss secrecy
Id. at 255, 2 Swan at 150.
TENN. Arr'v GEN. ABsnACT, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 8 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979).
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2601 (1975).
R. PERKINS, CRMINAL LAW 176 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS];
1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 371, at 735 (R. Anderson ed. 1957)
[hereinafter cited as WHARTON].
24. PERKINS, supra note 23, at 177-78; WHARTON, supra note 23, § 381, at
747-48.
25. 547 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
26. PERKINS, supra note 23, at 178.
19.
20.
Feb. 15,
21.
22.
23.
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in his consideration of kidnaping.'" Curiously, the Brown court
cited an annotation in support of the statement that "[o]ther
states, relying on the common law, have construed their statutes
to require secrecy or asportation or both."' The cited annotation, however, stated flatly that "[siecrecy was not an element" 2'
of kidnaping at common law.
Whether the Tennessee statute requires asportation or secrecy depends on what words are modified by the adverbs
"away" and "secretly." The crime is committed by one who
"confines, inveigles, or entices away" the victim. If the word
"away" modifies only "entices," then the act of detaining the
victim at the point of confrontation would fall within the statute. 0 Moreover, the mens rea required by the statute is an intent to do one of three things: "[T]o cause him to be secretly
confined, or imprisoned against his will, or to be sent out of the
state against his will." Only the third possibility necessitates
an intent to asport. This question appeared to be unequivocally
resolved in Cowan v. State,a which affirmed a conviction for
kidnaping without a showing of asportation. The defendant had
detained and terrorized two teen-age couples parked in a lovers'
lane for seven hours by seizing and retaining the ignition key to
their automobile. The court concluded simply that the victims
had been confined unlawfully within the meaning of the
statute.'
Eleven years later, with no effort to reconcile Cowan, the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held in McCracken v.
State"" that both asportation and secrecy were elements of the
statutory offense, and that failure to allege these elements in the
presentment voided the conviction. To reach this result the
court construed the word "away" to modify not only "entices,"
but also "confines" and "inveigles," thereby concluding that
27. WHARTON, supra note 23, §§ 371-378, at 735-45.
28. 574 S.W.2d at 61 (citing 68 A.L.R. 712).
29. Annot., 68 A.L.R. 719, 720 (1930).
30. See the hypothetical suggested in Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee
in 1973-A Critical Survey, 41 TENN. L. REv. 203, 215-16 (1974).
31. TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-2601 (1975).

32. 208 Tenn. 512, 347 S.W.2d 37 (1961).
33.
34.

Id. at 516, 347 S.W.2d at 39.
489 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
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proof of asportation was required. 5 Similarly, the word
"secretly" was read to modify not only "confined" but also "imprisoned," and thus, the court concluded that secrecy was essential to the crime.3 ' The court made no reference to the intent
required by the third alternative: "to cause him . . . to be sent
out of the state against his will."3 7 Presumably, the court recognized the syntactical objection to applying "secretly" to this
clause, because the introductory words "to be" isolated the third
alternative from the others." Thus, McCracken left open the
possibility of secrecy being eliminated as an element of kidnaping in those instances in which the intent is to send the victim
out of the state against his or her will.
Subsequent cases acknowledged McCracken as settling the
elements of kidnaping." In one decision, Jackson v.State,4 0 the
court particularly noted the requirement of secrecy, but since
the case concerned the confinement of the victim, the requirement of secrecy clearly was applicable.
In Brown v. State,' 1 however, the court once again concluded that neither secrecy nor asportation is an essential element of kidnaping as defined by the statute. The accused assaulted the victim in his motel room, bound and gagged him,
placed him in the closet, and subsequently robbed him. The conviction for kidnaping was appealed on the ground that there was
no evidence of asportation." The court concluded that much of
the confusion respecting the meaning of the statute had resulted
from a failure to recognize that section 39-2601 of the Tennessee
Code Annotated encompasses not only kidnaping but also false
imprisonment. 4' The three designated intentions in the statute

35. Id. at 52.
36. Id. at 52-53.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2601 (1975).
38. The statute requires that the accused intend the victim "to be

37.

secretly confined, or imprisoned against his will, or to be sent out of the state
against his will." Id. (emphasis added).
39. See Cherry v. State, 539 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); McBee v. State, 526 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
40. 540 S.W.2d 275, 276 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
41. 574 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

42. Id. at 59.
43. Id.at 61.
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provide separate and distinct bases for conviction, and "[t]he
proscribed acts are disjunctive and independent of one another." The gravamen of the offense was the intent to harm
the victim in the manner described; whether the modus operandi involved moving or confining the victim, secrecy or openness, the harm is essentially the same. This recognition that,
notwithstanding the chapter designation in the Code the statute
defines a set of offenses broader than kidnaping, may help eliminate the confusion which has resulted from an over-reliance
upon common-law elements in construing the statute.
C. Incest
When the same conduct is enjoined by a general statute and
a more specific statute, a fundamental rule of statutory construction prescribes that the more particular provision should
control." In State v. Nelson" the accuseds' conduct was within
the statute proscribing carnal abuse of a female under the age of
twelve47 and also within the incest statute." The defendants
contended that they could be charged only under the latter provision, which more particularly encompassed their illegal behavior. 4' The appellate court was unpersuaded, and found that the
two statutes were "specific to the same degree";50 therefore, an
indictment could be returned properly under either statute.
D. Robbery
A Tennessee statute in force for over a century provides:
If any person or persons disguised or in mask, by day or by
night, shall enter upon the premises of another, or demand en44. Id.
45.

(4th ed.
46.
1979).
47.
ch. 429,
48.
49.
and ten
50.

2A J.

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTES

AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §

51.05

1972).
577 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3705 (1975) (repealed by Act of June 5, 1979,
§§ 1-13, 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1095).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-705 (1975).
The minimum punishment was five years under the incest statute
years under the carnal knowledge statute. See id. §§ 39-705, -3705.
577 S.W.2d at 466.
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trance or admission into the house or inclosure of any citizen of

this state, it shall be considered prima facie that his or her intention is to commit a felony, and such demand shall be
deemed an assault with the intent to commit a felony .... "'
This provision has been construed in only two previous cases,
both decided shortly after its passage. In State v. Box 2 the
court held that it was not necessary to allege that the acts were
done with the intent to commit a felony." The court reasoned
that the legislative intent was to punish the act of entering or
attempting to enter premises while disguised. The statements of
prima facie intent to commit a felony were simply the "reasons
given for the infliction of the punishment rather than conditions
upon which the punishment of the offender is made to depend." In Walpole v. State" the court acknowledged that the
statute was enacted as a response to the terrorism of the Ku
Klux Klan." It agreed with the conclusion reached in Box that
"[the mere entry in disguise upon the premises of another is
made prima facie evidence of an intention to commit a felony,
and this of itself is a substantive offense, from which there is no
escape, except by proof that there was in fact no purpose to
commit crime.

5 7
1

In State v. Bryant" the supreme court rejected the Box and

51, TENN. Cons ANN. § 39-2802 (1975).
52. 1 Tenn. Cas. (1 Shan.) 461 (1875).
53. "The statute declares that the acts themselves shall be evidence of an
intent to commit a felony ....

"

Id. at 464.

54. Id. at 464-65.
55. 68 Tenn. (9 Bax.) 370 (1878).
56. It is apparent that the object of this statute was to repress a
great evil which arose in this country after the war, and which grew to
be an offense of frequent occurrence, that of evil-minded and mischievous persons disguising themselves to terrify or to wrong those who
happened to be the objects of their wrath or resentment. This was a
kind of mob law, enforced sometimes by a multitude of vagabounds,
who grew to be a great terror to the people, and placed human life
and property at the mercy of bad men, whose crimes could scarcely
ever be punished, because of the disguises under which they were
perpetrated.
Id. at 371-72.
57. Id. at 372.
58. 585 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1979).
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Walpole decisions in light of their "strained and unreasonable
construction of the statute.""6 A more plausible interpretation,
the court submitted, was that the offense consists of two elements: "1) Entry upon the premises of another while masked, 2)
with the intent to commit a felony."' 0 Given this interpretation,
the issue then arose whether an intent to commit a felony was a
permissible inference to be drawn from masked entry. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had relied upon Tot v.United
States," and its progeny' which required that the inference
must be such that "it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from
the proved fact on which it is made to depend."' 8 Subsequent to
the court of criminal appeals' decision, however, the United
States Supreme Court handed down Court of Ulster County v.
Allen "4 in which the inference question was reexamined. The
Court distinguished mandatory presumptions, to which the Tot
standard would apply, from permissive inferences that place no
burden of proof on the accused and allow, but do not require,
"the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the
prosecutor of the basic one." 6 In cases of permissive inferences,
the party challenging the use must "demonstrate its invalidity as
applied to him.""
In Bryant the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that

59. Id. at 588 n.1.
60. Id.
61. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
62. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
63. 395 U.S. at 36.
64. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
65. Id. at 157.
66. Id.
Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to
credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it
affects the application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in
that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible

inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively
rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination.
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the statutory presumption before it was permissive, not mandatory 7 and then turned to the facts of the case. The evidence left
no doubt that two companions of the accused had entered the
premises with the intent to rob. Under such circumstances, the
use of the permissive inferences against the accused was proper.
Because the instruction given the jury at least suggested a
mandatory presumption, the case was remanded for further
proceedings."
E. Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property
Among the classic logical puzzles in criminal law is whether
a conviction for an attempted crime should be sustained when
the crime attempted is, under the circumstances, legally impossible." ' In regard to the offense of receiving stolen property, the
cases of People v. Jaffe"5 and People v. Rojas7" frequently are
juxtaposed. In both cases, the accused had attempted to receive
stolen property, but unknown to him, the property had been recovered and, therefore, was not in fact stolen property at the
time of the transfer. In Jaffe the court held that the conviction
could not stand, because "the act, which it was doubtless the
intent of the defendant to commit would not have been a crime
if it had been consummated."' In Rojas the court reasoned that
since the act and intent of the accused were unaffected by the
objective nature of the property, the conviction should be
67.

585 S.W.2d at 589.

68. On retrial, the trial judge will instruct the jury fully concerning
the nature of the permissive inference established by the statute, assuming of course that there is sufficient evidence introduced at trial to
make the inference a rational one. The instructions should indicate

that the jury may, but need not, infer that a person intended to commit a felony from the fact of his entry upon the premises of another
while masked. The jury should be further instructed that the inference has no effect on the requirement that the State prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 590.
69. The most familiar portrayal of the dilemma is the hypothetical case

of Lady Eldon's french lace, first suggested in 1 WHARTON,

CRIMINAL LAw

n.9 (12th ed. 1932).

70. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
71.

55 Cal. 2d 252, 358 P.2d 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1961).

72.

185 N.Y. at 501, 78 N.E. at 169.

304
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sustained."
The Supreme Court of Tennessee was faced with this issue
for the first time in Bandy v. State, 4 wherein the accused had
requested another to burglarize a store and deliver the stolen
property to him. An officer discovered the property prior to delivery, and the thief permitted the officer to hide in the trunk of
his car when he delivered the property to the accused. Upon receipt of the property by the accused, the officer emerged and
made the arrest. The accused was convicted of concealing stolen
property 76 and he subsequently appealed."
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that a conviction for
concealing stolen property could not be sustained, because the
property was not in fact stolen at the time of the acts of the
accused. The court, however, did find that a conviction for attempt"7 would be appropriate and expressly adopted the rationale of Rojas as opposed to Jaffe. Because the attempt was a
lesser included offenses it was within the power of the appellate
court to modify the judgment,7* but only if the court imposed
the minimum sentence permitted for the lesser crime-" Since
there was no minimum punishment prescribed in the attempt
statute,8 ' the court remanded the case for a jury determination
of punishment.
As in the case of larceny, receiving and concealing stolen
property is a more serious crime if the property received has a

73. "In our opinion the consequences of intent and acts such as those of
defendants here should be more serious than pleased amazement that because
of the timeliness of the police the projected criminality was not merely detected but also wiped out." 55 Cal. 2d at 258, 358 P.2d at 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. at

468.
74.

575 S.W.2d 278 (Tenn. 1979).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4218 (1975) (amended 1980).
76. 575 S.W.2d at 278.
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-603 (1975).
78. See State v. Staggs, 544 S.W.2d 620 (Tenn. 1977).
79. See generally Corlew v. State, 181 Tenn. 220, 180 S.W.2d 900 (1944);
Peters v. State, 521 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
80. 181 Tenn. at 220, 180 S.W.2d at 900.
81. The statute called for "imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years, or, in the discretion of the jury, by imprisonment in the
county workhouse or jail not more than one (1) year, and by fine not exceeding
five hundred dollars ($500)."

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-603 (1975).
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value in excess of two hundred dollars.' 2 In Baker v. State" the
court addressed the issue whether valuation should be made at
the time of the theft or at the time the property was received by
defendant. The property stolen in Baker was blank checks of
only nominal value at the time of the theft. When received by
the accused, however, each check had been forged for an amount
in excess of one hundred dollars. Following the weight of authority from other jurisdictions," the court concluded that the value
of the stolen goods should be determined at the time of receipt. 8
F. Obscenity
The much-celebrated Tennessee Obscenity Act of 19786

was declared unconstitutional in Leech v. American Booksellers
Association"' and the prior obscenity law was reinstated.8 ' Justice Fones, writing for an unanimous court, noted that it was the
court's prerogative to construe the state constitutional counterpart to the first amendment of the federal constitution to prohibit all regulation of pornography, although it had no inclination to do so.89 On the other hand, the court could not impose a
more restrictive standard than that mandated by the United
States Supreme Court in Miller v. California" and its progeny.
Beyond the first amendment consideration, the court was also
82. The 1979 amendment to §§ 39-4217 to -4218 of the Tennessee Code
Annotated substituted the words "two hundred" for "one hundred."
83. TENN. ATr'y GEN. ABSTRACT, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 6-7 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 27, 1978).
84. The court cited Thompson v. United States, 464 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.
1972), involving stolen money orders. See also United States v. McClain, 545
F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Devall, 462 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Walker, 432 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1970); Herman v. United
States, 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1961); Boorstine v. State, 126 Ga. App. 90, 190
S.E.2d 83 (1972); People v. Cobetto, 66 11. 2d 488, 363 N.E.2d 854 (1977).
85. TENN. Arr'Y GEN. ABSTRACT, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 7 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 27, 1978).
86. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 846, §§ 1-8, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acta 1031 (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3001 to -3016 (Supp. 1980)).
87. 582 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1979).
88. See Act of Mar. 12, 1974, ch. 510, §§ 1-17, 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts 276.
89. 582 S.W.2d at 745.
90. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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concerned with provisions of the Act which were too vague to
satisfy federal and state constitutional requirements."
In Miller the Court articulated a three-pronged test for determining whether a work was obscene:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, .

.

. ; (b) whether the

work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
The Tennessee Act, in the words of the Leech court, "expand[ed] the Miller guidelines by eight lengthy and unique definitions of terms found therein."" The court focused its scrutiny
upon these definitions.
In Pinkus v. United States" the United States Supreme
Court had interpreted the term "average person" to include
both sensitive and insensitive people. "[T]he community includes all adults who constitute it. . .

."9

The Tennessee defi-

nition, however, was not limited to adults; it included "all individuals, irrespective of age." But the Supreme Court had
precluded such a definition in Pinkus: "[C]hildren are not to be
included for these purposes as part of the 'community' as that
term relates to the 'obscene materials .

..

.'

"

To hold other-

wise would be tantamount to reducing the permissible standard
of communication for adults to that acceptable for children. The
Leech court found that to include children in the definition of
average person unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expres91. 582 S.W.2d at 746 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;

TENN. CONST.

art.

I, § 8).
92. 413 U.S. at 24.
93. 582 S.W.2d at 746. The prior Obscenity Act had defined the terms

"average person," "contemporary community standards," "taken as a whole,"
"appeals to," "prurient interest," "sexual conduct depicted in a patently offensive way," "unwholesome," and "value." Id.
94.

436 U.S. 293 (1978).

95. Id. at 300.
96. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 846, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1034. See 582
S.W.2d at 746.
97. 436 U.S. at 297.
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sion secured by the first amendment."
The definition of average person was further limited under
the Tennessee Obscenity Act to one whose "attitude is the result
of human experience, understanding, development, culturalization, and socialization in Tennessee."" This, the court concluded, called for the impossible task of separating those influences derived from sources within the state from those outside
the state.' While Miller had acknowledged the legitimacy of
local community standards in identifying obscenity, "it is patently impermissible to attempt to localize the sources of stimuli, experience, etc., that contribute to one's 'attitude.' "1o To
the extent that such a dismembering was possible, and assuming
that the Tennessee stimuli would garner a more restrictive attitude on free expression, the constitutional flaw was essentially
the same as that resulting from including children in the defini12
tion of average person.

A third aspect of the term "average person" as defined in
the Tennessee Act limited the hypothetical attitude "to that
which is personally acceptable, as opposed to, that which might
merely be tolerated." 103 Again, the United States Supreme Court
had precluded such a conceptualization of the average person. In
Smith v. United States '" the Court stated that "contemporary
community standards must be applied by juries in accordance
with their own understanding of the tolerance of the average
98. 582 S.W.2d at 747.
99. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 846, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1034.
100. 582 S.W.2d at 748.
Tennesseans do not live in isolation from the remainder of the world,
even if they do not travel beyond state boundaries. Most, if not all,
Tennessee communities and vicinages have adults residing therein (1)
who were educated in our sister states or foreign lands, (2) who have
traveled extensively and acquired foreign culture, or (3) who were
born, developed, cultured and socialized in other states and foreign
lands. But, the definition would require screening out those "foreign"
influences, taking into consideration only that portion of their attitudes that resulted from experience, etc., in Tennessee.

Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1034.
431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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person in their community." 10'1 Once again, the Leech court
found the Tennessee definition unconstitutionally restrictive.1 "
The term "contemporary community standards" was defined in the Tennessee Act as expressions "deemed proper and
appropriate and . . . accepted in Tennessee society."'0 7 Cryptically, the court declared this definition unconstitutional for the
reasons discussed in invalidating the definition of average person. 10 8 It is not, however, apparent that the argument applies.
This definition is confined explicitly to adult expression and
does not attempt to isolate insular influences. Although the term
"accepted" is used, it is not contrasted with tolerance. Given the
aggregate constitutional shortcomings identified by the court,
the point is inconsequential. Nevertheless, it would not appear
too difficult to construe this definition as compatible with the
federal standards.
The meaning of the phrase "taken as a whole" as used in
the Miller test was addressed in Kois v. Wisconsin,",'a case in
which a state court found two photographs accompanying a
newspaper article to be obscene. The United States Supreme
Court held that the test was whether the photographs were "rationally related" to the article and whether the article was "a
mere vehicle for the publication of the pictures."'1 In contrast,
the Tennessee Act provided that bound volumes such as
magazines
may not be considered as a whole unless there is such interdependence of, between, or among the separate pieces that to remove any one of them materially would change the type, as
opposed to the quality, of the volume... otherwise, each separate piece or pictorial or combination of them shall be separately taken as a whole."'

105. Id. at 305.
106. 582 S.W.2d at 748.
107. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1034. See
582 S.W.2d at 748.
108. 582 S.W.2d at 748. See text accompanying notes 95-106 supra.
109. 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
110. Id. at 231.
111. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1035. See
582 S.W.2d at 749.
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The Leech court concluded that this innovation eliminated the
rational relationship test of Kois and gave carte blanche authority to condemn entire volumes upon a finding that an isolated
portion was obscene. Once again, the Act was irreconcilable with
the minimum standards mandated by the first amendment.
The phrase "prurient interest" was defined in Roth v.
United States' 2 as a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion,

. . .

if it goes substantially beyond customary

limits of candor in description or representation of such matters."1 1 The phrase was employed without further explication in
Miller, except that its application was limited to sex.1"4 The
Tennessee Act defined prurient interest as "that quality inherent in all human beings which when aroused evokes feelings of
shame, embarrassment, disgust, or revulsion or evidences
mental, emotional or physical pathology, or is degrading in that
it elicits unwholesome lusts, cravings, or longings. ' "" The Leech
court held that "[bly failing to include the essential element
that the interest appealed to and aroused must be sex, the definition is overbroad and constitutionally infirm."""
An additional term appearing in the Tennessee Act which is
not included in the Miller definition is the term "unwholesome,"
defined as
that which, if continued, would present an obstacle or impairment to culturalization according to prevailing norms and mores in society, including, but not limited to the removal of feel112. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
113. Id. at 487 n.20 (quoting MODRL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957)).
114. 413 U.S. at 24.
115. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1035. See
582 S.W.2d at 749.
116. 582 S.W.2d at 750. To the extent that the rationale for the ban on
obscenity is the public affront generated by such expression, the Tennessee
definition may be more plausible than that of the Supreme Court. The latter
has, without explanation, confined obscenity to what is more accurately identified as pornography. The Tennessee definition is subject-matter neutral, focusing instead upon effects, and therefore is more compatible with broader first
amendment principles. The Leech court nevertheless was correct in its conclusion that the Act is incongruent with the extant federal constitutional
standard.
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ings of guilt in contravention of cultural teachings that guilt is
the normal feeling providing inhibition which discourages similar performances under like circumstances." 7
The Leech court held that the phrase "norms and mores in society" was too vague to survive constitutional scrutiny.1 18
The Tennessee Act defined the clause "patently offensive"
broadly to include "a detailed description of sex, in any context." ' As the Act failed to comply with the Miller guidelines
in this respect,'s the first amendment requirements were again
not satisfied.
Finally, the third prong of the Miller test was paralleled in
the Tennessee Act by a definition of the term "value" which required that the challenged work must be (1) "an essential part
of the exposition of ideas," and (2) "of more than slight social
interest as a step to truth." 11 But even if these conditions were
satisfied, the work might nevertheless be condemned (3) if the
benefit derived was "clearly outweighed by the social interest in
public order, public decency, and public morality.""'" Each of
these components of the definition of value were held void for
vagueness and overbreadth. 1 5
The Tennessee Supreme Court briefly turned its attention
to the portion of the Act that identified parties subject to its
criminal sanctions as "a person, corporation or any other taxable
117. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1035-36. See
582 S.W.2d at 750.
118. "[Ejvery individual tends to regard his own views and behavior to
be consistent with, and representative of, the norms and mores of society." 582
S.W.2d at 750. The court considered "norms and mores" less ascertainable
than "institutions of the United States and the State of Washington." Id. at
750, 761 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964)).
119. 582 S.W.2d at 751 (construing Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2,
1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1036-37).
120. Miller provided two examples of a permissible statutory definition
of prohibited pornographic portrayals: "(a) Patently offensive representations
or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at 25.
121. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch. 510, § 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1036. See
582 S.W.2d at 752.
122. Id.
123. 582 S.W.2d at 753.
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entity."'12 4 Notwithstanding a gallant effort by the state,'" the
court was persuaded that the taxable-nontaxable entity distinction was "too vague to inform men of common intelligence who
is included and who is exempt." ' Furthermore, were the Act
construed to exempt certain religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational corporations, "the classification would have no rational basis in the context of the criminal offense involved
27
herein and would be void under the Equal Protection Clause.'1
In sum, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared void the
definitional subsections and the section identifying the parties
and left "a criminal act with no legally cognizable offense and no
identifiable parties to charge.""*8 Thus, the court found itself
with no alternative but to declare the entire Act void.' " '

124. Act of Apr. 12, 1978, ch, 510, j 2, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1038. See
582 S.W.2d at 753.
125. From the state's assignment or error:
Use of the suffix "able" normally has reference to whether a thing
is possible or impossible. If a car is repairable, it can be fixed. On the
other hand, if a car is irrepairable, it is impossible to fix it. If terrain is
traversable, it is possible to traverse it. If terrain is untraversable, it is
impossible to traverse it. Thusly, if an entity is taxable, it is possible
to tax it. If it is non-taxable, it is impossible to tax it. It is that simple.
582 S.W.2d at 753.
126. Id. at 755.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. While the Act did contain a severability clause, the court correctly
viewed this as "a mere aid to interpretation," id. at 756, and not as precluding
a total invalidation once the major components had been eliminated. The court
aptly quoted a passage from Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State ex rel. Rhodes,
510 S.W.2d 258 (Tenn. 1974), in which a prior obscenity statute had been
invalidated:
"[W]e fail to find any basis for doing anything other than holding
T.C.A. § 39-3007 unconstitutional and leaving it to the legislature to
adopt a new obscenity statute which fully complies with all the requisites of Miller v. California, supra. Moreover, for this Court to do anything more would have the effect of our rewriting Tennessee's present
obscenity statute. The function of this Court is to interpret a statute
against the constitution of this State and that of the United States
and we will not and cannot usurp the prerogatives of the legislature
by supplying essential elements to a statute which have been omitted
by that body."
582 S.W.2d at 756 (quoting 510 S.W.2d at 261).
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III.

A.

PROCEDURE

Arrest

1. Vehicle Stops
In Delaware v. Prousel" the United States Supreme Court

addressed the issue
whether it is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to stop an automobile, being driven
on a public highway, for the purpose of checking the driving
license of the operator and the registration of the car, where
there is neither probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing
the operation of motor vehicles or that either the car or any of
its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection
with the violation of any other applicable law.' 8 '
A patrolman had stopped an automobile for what he called a
routine driver's license check. As he walked toward the vehicle,
he smelled the odor of marijuana; when he looked inside, he ob-

served marijuana on the car floor. The admissibility of the seized
marijuana as evidence was the subject of the litigation.
The Court concluded that the stop was constitutionally impermissible, and that the marijuana was the fruit of the illegality

and therefore inadmissible. The Court held:
[Elxcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or
that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle
or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of
law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order
to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'
The Court expressly left open the question of the use of roadblock-type stops to check all automobiles or drivers during a
particular time period," 83 and implied that such practices would
130. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See 47 TENN. L. REV. 477 (1980).
131. Id. at 650.
132. Id. at 663.
133. See J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-PRETRIAL
RIcHTS § 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRrTRIAL RIGHTS].
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be legitimate. The principal concern was the "unbridled discretion of police officers" to stop vehicles at random. 8 4 In a concurring opinion Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, went
further to suggest that "other not purely random stops (such as
every 10th car to pass a given point)" would also be permissible.13 5 Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, argued that if all
vehicles could be stopped, and every tenth vehicle could be
stopped, then there was no reason why a single vehicle could not
be stopped, if indeed the stop was purely random.'"
2.

Temporary Detention

An issue unaddressed by Terry v. Ohio1" 7 and its progeny is
whether the power to detain an individual creates an obligation
for the detainee to dissuade the officer of his suspicion. In
Brown v. Texas'" two police officers, while cruising in a patrol
car, observed the accused and another man walking away from
one another in an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug
traffic. They stopped the accused and, pursuant to a state statute,' 3 ' asked him to identify himself and explain what he was
doing. One of the officers testified that he stopped the accused
because the situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen
that subject in that area before."' 4 The officers did not claim to
suspect the accused of any specific misconduct, nor did they
have any reason to believe he was armed. When the accused refused to identify himself, he was arrested for violating the statute which made it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give
his name and address to an officer "who has lawfully stopped
him and requested the information." 14 ' A motion by the accused
to set aside on constitutional grounds an information charging
him with violation of the statute was denied, and the accused
was convicted and fined. The Supreme Court reversed upon a

440 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
139. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
140. 443 U.S. at 49.
141. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974).

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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finding that "the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct.""" The Court noted that it was not required to decide
whether an individual could be punished for refusing to identify
43
himself if he were subject to a lawful investigatory stop.
The propriety of a detention under' circumstances short of
probable cause arose in Tennessee in Hughes v. State.'" Hughes
and Neese, two college students, drove to a combination grocery
store and restaurant around midnight. Neese asked the owner if
the store was open, and when told that it was, returned to the
automobile. Following a brief conversation, Hughes drove away.
Neese returned to the store, bought a soft drink and some
snacks, and browsed the magazine rack and other parts of the
store. Because his suspicion was aroused, the owner of the store
telephoned the police and requested that they investigate. The
owner did not articulate particular facts giving rise to his suspicion." Upon arriving at the store, the officers asked Neese to
step outside, identify himself, and sit in the rear seat of the patrol car. The officers maintained that Neese was free to go, but
since there were no interior door handles in the back seat, he
could only have left with the assistance of someone outside. The
court was thus convinced that he was detained for fourth
amendment purposes. 1 4 Although a radio check indicated that
Neese had no criminal record, he was kept in the back of the
patrol car while the officer left in search of Hughes, who was not
suspected of any criminal activity. Hughes was found on an interstate ramp and followed the officer back to the store. Hughes

142. 443 U.S. at 53.
143. Id. at 53 n.3.
144. 588 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979).
145. This is the sole information upon which the police acted. There
is no proof that the police officers knew the proprietor or that he was
reliable. There is no indication that his establishment was located in a

high crime area and none that any crime had been committed or was
about to be committed. Herbert advised of no specific fact that would
constitute "strange or suspicious" conduct. And it must be borne in
mind that Neese was in a public business during the hours it was open
to the public.
Id. at 299.
146. Id.
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was asked to exhibit his driver's license, and when he rolled
down the window, the officer smelled burning marijuana. Then
the vehicle was searched and a quantity of marijuana was found,
which led to the conviction of the defendant.' 47 The Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that there was
an insufficient basis for the initial detention of Neese, and that
the subsequent search of the vehicle occupied by Hughes similarly was tainted.'"

3. Probable Cause
To satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment, an
arrest must be based on probable cause. If probable cause is not
present at the time the arrest is made, it is immaterial that the
arresting officer was correct in his suspicions. Conversely, if
probable cause exists, the arrest will be valid even though it is
later determined that the arrested individual was not implicated
in any crime.' 49 In Michigan v. DeFilippo'0 the Supreme Court
was concerned with the validity of an arrest made in good faith
reliance on an ordinance that subsequently was declared unconstitutional. Detroit police officers found the accused in an alley
with a woman who was in the process of lowering her slacks.
When asked for identification, the accused gave inconsistent and
evasive responses. He was arrested for violating a Detroit ordinance which provided that a police officer could question an in147. Whether the officer directed Hughes to roll down the window or he
did so voluntarily was a matter in dispute, but the court's disposition of the
case made resolution of the issue unnecessary. Defendant ultimately was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of resale. Id. at 297-98.
148. The court viewed "the activities of Neese and Hughes as being inseparable for purposes of adjudicating the Fourth Amendment rights of
Hughes." Id. at 308. While this is in a sense true, it should be understood that
Hughes would lack standing to object to any violation of Neese's fourth
amendment rights. Here, there was no more justification (indeed less) for detaining Hughes than there had been for detaining Neese. Had Neese, however,
confessed that he and Hughes were preparing to rob the store, Hughes could
have been arrested for the conspiracy, even though Neese's rights had been
violated. No fourth amendment right of Hughes would have been compromised
in the gaining of the probable cause.
149. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
150. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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dividual if the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the
individual's behavior called for further investigation for criminal
activity. "1 The ordinance further provided that it was unlawful
for any person so stopped to refuse to identify himself and produce evidence of his identity. " In the search which followed,
the officers discovered drugs on the person of the defendant,
who was then charged with a drug offense, rather than with violation of the ordinance. The trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence found in the search. The Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed and held that the Detroit ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, that both the arrest and search were invalid because the accused had been arrested pursuant to the ordinance, and that the evidence obtained in the search should
have been suppressed on federal constitutional grounds, even
though it was obtained as a result of an arrest pursuant to a
presumptively valid ordinance. 1" The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that at the time
of the arrest the officer had probable cause, and that the subsequent invalidation of the ordinance on grounds of vagueness did
not undermine the validity of the arrest.'"
4.

Fruits of Illegal Arrest

In Dunaway v. New York,"" a case virtually indistinguishable from Brown v. Illinois'" in which the Supreme Court held
a confession excludable as the fruit of an illegal arrest, the Court
held that a suspect could not be subjected to custodial interrogation on less than probable cause." 7 A police detective had questioned a jail inmate regarding the implication of the accused in
an attempted robbery and homicide, but the detective did not
learn enough to establish probable cause to arrest. Nevertheless,
the accused was picked up and brought in for questioning. He
was given Miranda warnings, waived his right to counsel, and
151,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See 443 U.S. at 33 n.1.
Id.
80 Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977).
443 U.S. at 40.
442 U.S. 200 (1979).
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
442 US. at 216.
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eventually made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the offense. A motion to suppress the statements
and sketches was denied, and the accused was convicted. The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction,'" but the

United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Brown. 5 9
On remand the trial court granted the motion to suppress, but
the appellate division reversed, and held that although the police lacked probable cause.to arrest the accused, officials nevertheless could detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion for
questioning for a reasonable period of time, so long as fifth and
sixth amendment rights amply were protected, and that, in any
event, the taint of any illegal detention was sufficiently attenuated.'60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the
conviction, and found that the administering of Miranda warnings, as in Brown, could not serve to eliminate the effect of a
fourth amendment violation or sanction the admissibility of its
"
fruits. '
B. Search and Seizure
1. Plain View
A peculiar corollary of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement is the notion that for the evidence to qualify
for the exception, its discovery must be inadvertent. The inadvertency requirement had its genesis in Coolidge v. New Hampshire' in which the exception was said to be inapplicable
"where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in
advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it."'"
Given the constitutional preference for warrants, the Court reasoned that requiring a prior judicial authorization for the seizure
when the presence of the evidence was already known imposed

158. People v. Dunaway, 35 N.Y.2d 741, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d
912 (1974).
169. Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975).
160. People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D. 2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978).
161.

442 U.S. at 216.

162.
163.

403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Id. at 470.
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In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice White challenged the inadvertency requirement as being at odds with the
purposes served by the fourth amendment."' He hypothesized a
case in which a house was searched pursuant to a warrant authorizing the seizure of a rifle purportedly used in a murder.' 66
In the course of the search, two photographs of the victim were
found in plain view, one unexpected, the other anticipated. The
inadvertency requirement would permit the seizure of the first
but not the second photograph, a result that achieved consistency with the principle of requiring warrants when feasible, but
was actually counterproductive to the protection of fourth
amendment values."" The likely scenario in such a case would
be for the police to return to the magistrate for a second warrant
authorizing the seizure of the anticipated items that they had
now observed. Ultimately, the accused would have been the victim of two separate invasions of his privacy, instead of one.
Such a rule will have the effect of encouraging police to enumerate all the items they wish to seize at the time the warrant is
sought. This is a laudable result and would be a compelling reason for the inadvertency requirement if police actually gained
some advantage from failing to make such an enumeration. In
actuality, the opposite is true. The police are only permitted to
search in those areas where the enumerated items might be
found and only until they have found them all; however, the potential range of the search and the possibility of discovering
unenumerated items in plain view is greater when the list of
specified items is larger. Only in a case in which the officers are
truly looking and expect to find evidence of a crime wholly unrelated to the subject of the affidavit might it be said that a subterfuge is being used, but such cases can be distinguished and
held unconstitutional for that very reason.""
164. Id. at 470-76.
165. Id. at 515-18 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
166. Id. at 516 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
167. Id. at 516-18 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
168. Cases holding an arrest, valid in itself, insufficient to support a
search incident to the arrest when the search was the primary motivation for
the arrest, would appear analogously applicable here. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS,
supra note 133, § 44, at 278 n.1.
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While the inadvertency requirement of Coolidge was supported by only four Justices, and the Court has not had occasion
to apply the notion since, it nevertheless has been accepted
widely by lower courts as an integral part of the plain view exception.' An issue unaddressed in Coolidge and ignored by
lower courts prior to United States v.Hare' was the precise
meaning of inadvertence. In Hare, officers had obtained a warrant to search the accused's home for firearms and ammunition.
In addition to nineteen firearms and a quantity of ammunition,
the officers seized narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. This
evidence was excluded by the district court on the ground that
the officers had expected to find narcotics, and the warrant had
therefore been used as a subterfuge to search for evidence of
drug offenses.' 7 ' The court of appeals reversed, finding that the
lower court erred in defining inadvertent as "unexpected" or
"unanticipated."'' The difficulty arose from the fact that the
evidence could be expected or anticipated, but the expectation
might fall short of probable cause. Without probable cause, it
would not have been possible to obtain a warrant for the particular seizure at the outset. The result would be the creation of a
class of items that simply could not be seized-neither with a
warrant for lack of probable cause, nor under the plain view exception for lack of inadvertence. The logical solution was to interpret inadvertent to mean lack of probable cause to believe the
evidence would be discovered at the site of the search."'
2.

Open Fields

The continuing vitality of the open fields exception to the
warrant requirement has preoccupied Tennessee courts for the
past several years.1
The controversy has centered upon

169. See id. § 47, at 310 n.15.
170. 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979).
171. Id. at 1293.
172. Id. at 1293-94.
173. Id. at 1294.
174. See Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1976-77-A Critical Survey, 45 TENN. L. REv. 1, 28-30 (1977); Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in
1977-78-A Critical Survey, 46 TPENN. L. Rim. 473, 505-07 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as 1977-78 Survey].
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whether the Katz v. United States" 5 reasonable expectation of
privacy conceptualization of the fourth amendment would require a search warrant for an open field area. In State v. Wert "'
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had so concluded, albeit over a vigorous dissent. The following year, in Sesson v.
State,' 77 the same court distinguished Wert, but Judge Tatum,
the dissenter in Wert, concurred insisting that Wert should be
overruled as an aberration. 75
The issue was finally addressed by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in State v. Lakin.'17 Officers had received a tip that "either a moonshine still or a marijuana patch" would be found on
a named farm. 1 0 Within two hours after receiving the tip, officers went to the farm and finding no one there, followed a path
a quarter of a mile to a barn, and from there followed another
path that led to a marijuana patch some fifty to one hundred
feet away. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had excluded the seized marijuana under the authority of Wert. While
affirming the judgment, the Tennessee Supreme Court nevertheless took the opportunity to express its disapproval of the
reasoning in Wert. The court noted that the decision establishing the open fields doctrine, Hester v. United States,18 1 had
been cited by the Supreme Court as authoritative since Katz,'"
although it conceded that the facts in Hester were substantially
dissimilar to those in the present case. 18
The court noted that the use of the phrase "open fields" or
a similar alternative was no substitute for a factual analysis of
the reasonableness of the search. While this is undeniably cor-

175. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
176. 550 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
177. 563 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
178. Id. at 803-04 (Tatum, J., concurring).
179. 588 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. 1979).
180. Id. at 545.
181. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
182. But see Air Poll. Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
183. "There, police officials went upon the premises of the defendant and
concealed themselves at a distance of from fifty to one hundred yards from his
residence. They saw him dispense illegal whiskey and recovered containers
when he and one of his customers discarded them while fleeing from the officers." 588 S.W.2d at 547.
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rect, the essence of the dispute is which question is the appropriate one: (1) did the search occur in an open field, or (2) did
the search invade a reasonable expectation of privacy? Ironically, in the final analysis, the supreme court has not taken issue
with the result in Wert but has affirmed the decision in Lakin.
The dispute would appear to be a tempest in a tea pot. Wert did
no more than hold, in the words of the Lakin court, that the
open field doctrine "had been significantly modified by later decisions, particularly Katz v. United States."'" In the present
case, the court of criminal appeals apparently found that the
reasonable expectation of privacy protected by Katz had once
again suffered an intrusion. The supreme court preferred to hold
that the search was unreasonable, because the area "was not
'wild and wasteland' which might be 'roamed at will without a
search warrant.' ,,i" It remains problematic whether the differing approaches would ever lead to differing results.
3.

Vehicles

In 1977 in United States v. Chadwick"' the United States
Supreme Court held that a footlocker seized from the trunk of
an automobile incident to an arrest could not be searched later
without first obtaining a warrant." 7 Although the prosecution
had not argued the Vehicle exception on appeal, the dissent contended that the vehicle search would have applied had the officers waited until the vehicle was moving and then stopped it.'"
While the majority left little doubt that the vehicle exception
would no more justify the search than the arrest exception,"'
the possibility was not completely laid to rest until the decision

184. Id. at 546.
185. Id. at 549. It would appear unlikely that officers could have obtained
a warrant in any event. An informant who is unsure whether the illegal presence is a moonshine still or a marijuana patch would appear to be of dubious
reliability. Apparently this was the sole source of information leading to the
search.
186. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
187. See 1977-78 Survey, supra note 174, at 499-502.
188. 433 U.S. at 22-23 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
189. See 1977-78 Survey, supra note 174, at 502 n.185; text accompanying note 174 supra.
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in Arkansas v. Sanders.'" Acting on information from an informant that the accused would arrive at an airport carrying a
green suitcase containing marijuana, police officers placed the
airport under surveillance. They observed the accused retrieve a
green suitcase from the airline baggage service, place it in the
trunk of a taxi, and enter the vehicle with a companion. When
the taxi drove away, two of the officers stopped it and requested
the driver to open the trunk. The officers then opened the suitcase and discovered marijuana. The accused was charged with
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. A motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the suitcase was denied by the
trial court and the accused was convicted. The state supreme
court reversed, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed because it was obtained in an unlawful search. The Supreme Court agreed. Conceding that "[a] closed suitcase in the
trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in which
it rides,"1' ' once the suitcase had been seized and was within the
control of the police, no exigency remained to justify a warrantless search.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented as
they had in Chadwick, submitting that, rather than clarifying
Chadwick, the Court had left the proper result "hanging in
limbo"'" when a vehicle search turns up "[a] briefcase, [a] wallet, [a] package, [a] paper bag . . . an orange crate, a lunch
bucket, an attache case, a duffiebag, a cardboard box, a
backpack, a totebag, [or] a paper bag.""'
Even without probable cause to believe that seizable evidence will be found within, searches are frequently sustained
under the inventory theory when police have gained lawful custody of the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court has sustained such searches when the vehicle is subject to forfeiture because of its use,'" when the vehicle is itself the instrumentality
of a crime,'" and when the vehicle has been involved in an acci-

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Id. at 763.
Id. at 768 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 768, 772 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
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dent but, the intoxicated driver is in no condition to make arrangements for its removal from the highway. 96 In the most recent inventory search case to reach the Court, South Dakota v.
Opperrnan, 7 the vehicle of the accused had been ticketed at
three in the morning for being illegally parked. Seven hours later
the vehicle was ticketed a second time, and arrangements were
made to have it impounded. At the impound lot, an officer observed a watch on the dash board. The vehicle thereupon was
unlocked and inventoried, which led to the discovery of a plastic
bag of marijuana and the subsequent conviction of the accused
for possession of marijuana. The Supreme Court sustained the
inventory search and noted several factors that made the official
conduct reasonable. Initially, the police had not acted precipitously; the vehicle had been impounded only after it had remained parked illegally for an extended period and was the subject of multiple parking violations. The owner had not been
present when the impoundment decision was made, and therefore he could not make alternative arrangements for the protection of his belongings. The impoundment had been in accordance with standard procedures of the police department,
procedures that were common throughout the country. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a pretextual inventory as a subterfuge for a search for evidence of crime. 'O
It is hardly surprising that the Opperman rationale has
been very popular with lower courts in sustaining vehicle inventories."19 Nevertheless, the holding is limited as the Supreme
Court of Tennessee recognized in Drinkard v. State.0 0 The accused had been arrested for driving while intoxicated and was
advised that, pursuant to police regulations, his automobile
would be impounded and inventoried. 01' The accused, however,
196. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
197. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
198. Nevertheless, on remand the Supreme Court of South Dakota persisted in its previous determination that the search was unreasonable and this
time based its decision on the state constitution. State v. Opperman, 247

N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
199. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 133, § 61, at 206 n.143 (Supp.
1979).
200. 584 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1979).
201. Id. at 651-52 & 651 n.1.
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requested that his female companion, who was not intoxicated
and was capable of driving the vehicle, be permitted to drive the
car away. The request was refused on the ground that the woman was neither the wife of the arrestee nor the owner of the
vehicle. The automobile was searched completely prior to the arrival of the wrecker, and marijuana was discovered in a closed
box on the front seat and in a rolled-up grocery sack in the
trunk. 02 The Tennessee Supreme Court, holding that the search
was unreasonable, articulated a standard not inconsistent with
the Opperman holding:
[If the circumstances that bring the automobile to the attention of the police in the first place are such that the driver,
even though arrested, is able to make his or her own arrangements for the custody of the vehicle, or if the vehicle can be
parked and locked without obstructing traffic or endangering
the public, the police should permit the action to be taken
rather than impound the car against the will of the driver and
then search it.'
The court noted that police regulations could not serve to legitimate an illegal search, a result similar to that reached by other
state courts.' A final point urged by the prosecution-that an
intoxicated driver is per se incompetent both to authorize another to take control of his automobile and to absolve the police
of any liability-was also rejected because such a finding would
be inconsistent with the judicial recognition that intoxicated
persons effectively can consent to tests for intoxication, consent
to search, and make admissible confessions.'" Incapacity is a
202. Id. at 652. The Chadwick implications, see text accompanying notes
186-89 supra, were not considered by the court.

203. 584 S.W.2d at 653.
204. Id. at 654. See, e.g., Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 127,
73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968), quoted in Drinkard v. State, 584 S.W.2d 650, 653
(Tenn. 1979); Chuz v. State, 330 So. 2d 166 (Fla. App. 1976); State v. Ludvicek,
147 Ga. App. 784, 250 S.E.2d 503 (1978); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581
S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979); State v. LaRue, 368 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1979); State v.
Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1977); State v. Patterson, 583 S.W.2d 277

(Mo. App. 1979); State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131 (Mont. 1977); State v.
Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 397 A.2d 1050 (1979); State v. Hardman, 17 Wash. App.
910, 567 P.2d 238 (1977).

205. 584 S.W.2d at 654.
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question of fact, and the State had made no showing in
Drinkard that the accused was too intoxicated to transfer custody of the automobile to his companion.
4. Standing
Twenty years ago, in Jones v. United States," the Supreme Court held that a party would have standing to object to
a search if he was "legitimately on [the] premises" at the time of
the search. 07 Jones was found to have standing to object to the
search of the apartment of a friend who had provided him with
a key and authorized him to use it. In Rakas v.Illinois'" the

Supreme Court held not only that the Jones decision had gone
too far, but that the development of fourth amendment jurisprudence was not served by the use of the standing requirement."
Henceforth, the Court simply would address whether the defendant had a recognizable fourth amendment interest that was violated by the official activity."'

The accused in Rakas had been passengers in an automobile
driven by the owner that had been stopped and searched shortly
following an armed robbery. A box of rifle shells was found in
the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the
front passenger seat. Although the accused did not assert ownership of either item, they nevertheless contended they could chhllenge the, constitutionality of the search, either under a broadened standing requirement permitting the target of the search to
raise the issue, or more narrowly under Jones, since they were
legitimately in the vehicle at the time of the search."'
The Court declined to expand the class of parties who might
raise a fourth amendment objection, and disapproved Jones to
the extent that it appeared to afford standing in the case."' It
was concluded that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on
the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth
206.
207.
208.
209.

362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Id. at 267. See PaRrmAL RIGwrs, supra note 133, § 76, at 446 n.16.
439 U.S. 128 (1978). See 46 TENN.L. Riv. 827 (1979).
439 U.S. at 142-48.

210.
211.
212.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 141-43.
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Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.""12 8 The Court had no
quarrel with the conclusion in Jones, which was in retrospect
entirely consistent with the Katz"' reasonable expectation of
privacy conceptualization of the fourth amendment:
[T]he holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that
Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises
he was using and therefore could claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental invasion of
those premises, even though his "interest" in those premises
might not have been a recognized property interest at common
1
law.' '

Unlike Jones, the accused in the present case could not claim a
legitimate expectation of privacy either in the locked glove compartment or under the seat, and therefore their fourth amendment interests were not compromised.
C. Extradition
In Michigan v. Doran'"O the United States Supreme Court
considered the scope of the judicial inquiry into a grant of extradition. Respondent had been arrested in Michigan and charged
with receiving and concealing a stolen truck. The truck had been
stolen in Arizona, and authorities in that state were notified of
the arrest. Thereafter the Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition, with an arrest warrant, two supporting affidavits, and the original complaint on which the charge was
based." 7 The Governor of Michigan in turn issued a warrant for
respondent's arrest and extradition."'
The respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan court, contending that the extradition warrant was invalid
because it did not comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.'" The writ was twice denied, and the denial was sus213. Id. at 139.
214. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
215. 439 U.S. at 143.
216. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
217. Id. at 284.

218. Id.
219.

MICH. Cow'. LAws

ANN.

J§ 780.1 to -.31 (1968).
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tained by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and mandated the
release of respondent.110 The court relied upon a provision of the
Uniform Act, also in effect in Tennessee, 2 ' which required that
an affidavit must "substantially charge" the fugitive with having
committed a crime under the law of the demanding state."'
Reading this provision in tandem with Gerstein v. Pugh,"' the
state supreme court had concluded that the courts of an asylum
state could review the action of the governor in granting extradition, including a reexamination of the factual basis for the finding of probable cause asserted by the demanding state." 4
The Supreme Court reversed, placing primary focus on the
extradition clause of the federal constitution.'" "The purpose of
the Clause," the Court said, "was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state
and thus 'balkanize' the administration of criminal justice
among the several states.""1 Extradition was intended to be
summary and mandatory, without the preliminary inquiry typically employed following an arrest. In an early decision"27 the
Court had said that the obligation of the governor of the asylum
state was "merely ministerial,'
and in the present case the
Court observed that the "governor's grant of extradition is
prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory re220. In re Doran, 401 Mich. 235, 258 N.W.2d 406 (1977).
221.
222.

TENN. Coo. ANN.

§§ 40-1001 to -1035 (1975).

Id. § 40-1010.

223. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The Gerstein decision mandated a prompt
hearing on probable cause for an incarcerated person arrested without a
warrant.
224. 401 Mich. at 240-42, 258 N.W.2d at 408-09.

225. 439 U.S. at 286-90. The extradition clause provides that
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,

shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which
he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 2, cl. 2.

226. 439 U.S. at 287.
227.

Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 717, 24 How. 66 (1860).

228. Id. at 106.
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quirements have been met.'"2 2 On a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the only questions for a court are "(a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state;
(c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for
extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. " I" So
viewed, the demand in the present case was sufficient, and the
courts of the asylum state were bound constitutionally under the
extradition clause to accept the judicial determination of the demanding state. Once the governor of the asylum state had issued
the warrant for arrest and extradition, no further judicial inquiry into probable cause in the asylum state was permissible."1
D. Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is satisfied by granting potential grand jury witnesses immunity from the use of
their testimony as evidence against them; their testimony before
the grand jury may therefore be compelled without fear of constitutional deprivation."' In New Jersey v. Portash"' the Supreme Court considered whether such immunized grand jury
testimony could be used to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant. The accused, a township mayor, was subpoenaed
to appear before a state grand jury, at which time it was agreed
that his testimony could not be used in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. The accused was thereafter indicted for misconduct
in office, and before trial, defense counsel sought a ruling that
the immunized testimony would not be admitted.'" The trial
judge refused to so rule, submitting that the testimony could be
used for impeachment under appropriate circumstances. Because of this ruling, the accused did not take the stand. The
New Jersey appellate court reversed his conviction and held that
the use of such testimony to impeach would have violated the
privilege against self-incrimination and that the decision of the
229.
230.
231.
232.

439 U.S. at 289.
Id.
Id. at 298 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring).
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

233. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
234.

Id. at 452.
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accused not to testify resulted from the erroneous ruling of the
trial court.23 5 On appeal, the prosecution argued that (1) the accused could not invoke the privilege because he did not take the
stand, and that (2) immunized grand jury testimony could be
used for impeachment purposes. " The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision in favor of the accused. As to the first point, since
the state appellate court had concluded that the issue had been
raised properly, the Supreme Court saw no reason to disagree.
7 that the
Moreover, the Court had held in Brooks v. Tennessee"1
8
privilege implicates a right to testify," and that it was evident
that the right of the accused had been chilled in this case. Secondly, the prosecution had relied upon Harris v. New York"'9
and Oregon v. Has"' for its argument that the testimony could
be used for impeachment purposes. However, in both those cases
the Court had noted explicitly that the statements used for impeachment were not coerced or involuntary. In the present case,
to the contrary, "[testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity was the essence of coerced testimony.""' The
matter here implicated was "the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form,""' and
the balancing approach employed in Harris and Hass was
inapplicable."3'

235. State v. Portash, 151 N.J. Super. 200, 376 A.2d 950 (1977).
236. Id. at 207-09, 376 A.2d at 954.
237. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
238. Id. at 612-13. See Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1972-A
Critical Survey, 40 TENN. L. Rav. 569, 610-12 (1972).
239. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
240. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
241. 440 U.S. at 459.
242. Id.
243. There were two concurring opinions, involving four justices, although both opinions indicate that the author joined in the opinion, as well as
the decision, of the Court. Id. at 460 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring);
id. at 462 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). Justice Blackmun, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, dissented, maintaining that the claimed burden on the
right to testify was too speculative to warrant reversal of the conviction. Id. at
463 (Blackmun J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
at 724 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 726 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 226 (Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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Confessions

1. Juveniles
Among the rights granted by the Miranda decision "'" is the
right to consult with an attorney prior to interrogation. 1 " Most

courts that have addressed the issue have held that there is no
right to consult anyone other than counsel,'4 6 although a few
have recognized the right of a minor to consult his or her parents.' In Fare v. Michael C."1 the Supreme Court considered
whether law enforcement officers must honor the request of a
juvenile to consult with his probation officer. The accused, a sixteen year old on probation by order of the juvenile court, was
taken into custody by police on suspicion of murder. Before being questioned at the station house, he was advised fully of his
Miranda rights. He requested to see his probation officer, but
when the request was denied, he stated that he would talk to the
officers without consulting an attorney and proceeded to make
statements and draw sketches implicating himself in the murder.
When the accused was charged in juvenile court with the murder, he moved to suppress the incriminating statements and
sketches on the ground that they had been obtained in violation
of Miranda, because the request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his fifth amendment right to remain
silent, just as if he had requested the assistance of an attorney.
The court denied the motion and held that the facts showed the
respondent had waived his right to remain silent, notwithstanding his request to see his probation officer.2 ' The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the request to see the probation officer was a per se invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in the same way the request
for an attorney was found to be in Miranda.' The holding was
244.
245.
RIGHTS §
246.
247.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See J. COOK, CONSTrToriONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-TRIAL
80, at 309-13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TRiAL RIGHTS].
Id, at 314 n.56.
Id. n.57.

248. 442 U.S.. 707 (1979).
249. Id,at 712.
250. In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358
(1978).
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based on the court's view that a probation officer occupied a position of trust that would make it normal for the juvenile to turn
to the officer when apprehended by the police. The court also
cited a state law that required the officer to represent the juvenile's interest."'
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Assuming
without deciding that Miranda applied with full force in juvenile proceedings,' 5 ' the Court concluded that consultation with a
probation officer was not a protected right. Miranda was based
on the "perception that the lawyer occupies a critical position in
our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the
Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation."'5 8 Not only is a probation officer not similarly qualified,
but the duty of the probation officer may be in sharp conflict
with the interest of the juvenile.' 4 Whether the juvenile effectively waived his Miranda rights was to be determined by an
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation;"' the record in the present case supported a finding of effective waiver.
While the reluctance of the Court to modify the Miranda
requirements is hardly surprising, the case would appear to be
more appropriately examined under a due process standard of
fundamental fairness and de facto voluntariness.'" The record
suggests that the accused's probation officer was the only person
he trusted. Given the particular vulnerability of juveniles to official overbearing, and given the seriousness of the offense with
which the accused in this case was charged, the denial of access
to the only individual the accused expressed a desire to speak to
might well have a bearing on the voluntariness of the subsequent confession. While the majority is correct that the probation officer might induce improperly the accused to confess, that
is a separate issue determinable on the facts. For instance, as-

251. Id. at 476, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (citing CAL. WELF. &
CoDz §§ 280 & 650 (West 1980) & CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.5 (West 1980)).
252. 442 U.S. at 717 n.4.
253. Id. at 719.
254. Id. at 721.
255. Id. at 724-25.
256. See id. at 732-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).

INST.
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sume that a properly trained probation officer, cognizant of the
seriousness of the charges, would advise the juvenile to obtain
the services of an attorney. If the accused then elected to talk to
the police, there would be a far stronger case for a finding of
waiver than that presented by the record.
In Tennessee, a juvenile taken into custody must be (1) released to his or her parents, (2) taken before the juvenile court,
or (3) delivered to a custodian designated by the court "within a
reasonable time."" 767 A statement obtained from a juvenile in the
course of a violation of the statute "shall not be used against
him."'"m In Colyer v. States" the court was called upon to decide
whether a statement obtained in violation of these provisions,
but otherwise admissible, should be excluded from evidence in a
criminal, as opposed to a juvenile, court.
The accused was arrested for rape about 9:00 p.m. the day
following the perpetration of the offense. He was taken to the
sheriff's office where, after effectively waiving his Miranda
rights, he made a statement that was used at his criminal trial
for rape to impeach his testimony. In affirming the conviction
the court held that since the provision embracing the exclusionary rule referred to an "extra-judicial statement. . . obtained in
the course of violation of this chapter,"' 60 its application should
be confined to proceedings in juvenile courts. The court reasoned that since an adult could in no event avail himself to the
special protections of .the juvenile code, a juvenile subject to being treated as an adult should be treated equivalently.
This conclusion would not appear to be as logically inevitable as the court suggests. Justice Henry, in dissent, called attention to State v. Strickland," in which the court had said that
confessions obtained in violation of the prompt release statute
"were not admissible before the Juvenile Court or the Circuit
Court.""' The majority distinguished Strickland on the ground
257.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-215 (1977).

258.
259.

Id. § 37-227(b).
577 S.W.2d at 460 (Tenn. 1979).

260.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 37-227(b) (1977), discussed in 577 S.W.2d at

463.
261. 532 S.W.2d 912 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976). See
577 S.W.2d at 463 (Henry, J., dissenting).

262.

532 S.W.2d at 918.
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that the issue there was the admissiblity of a confession at a
transfer hearing in juvenile court or on appeal and at a de novo
hearing on the question of transfer in circuit court."3
More to the point, however, is the language and the purpose
of the exclusionary provision. The statute states quite simply
that the statement "shall not be used against him."' " Chief Justice Henry submitted that the language was "not susceptible to
an erosive construction that would limit its sweep to procedures
in the juvenile court.""' Furthermore, it was uncontroverted
that the prompt release statute was violated. If the purpose of
this statute is to protect juveniles because of their particular
vulnerability to government officials, that intent is unaffected by
whether they ultimately are tried in juvenile court or criminal
court. If anything, the fact that the charges are very serious ones
would countenance greater caution in protecting the juvenile.
Chief Justice Henry observed that while the "statutory metamorphosis" had transformed the defendant from a boy to a man,
he nevertheless remained a boy. * "
2. Waiver of Rights
The effectiveness of the waiver of Miranda rights was
before the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Butler.2'7 The

accused, charged with kidnaping, armed robbery, and felonious
assault, was given the Miranda rights on a printed form. He acknowledged that he understood them, but refused to sign the
waiver at the bottom of the form. When the officers said they
wished to talk to him, he responded, "I will talk to you but I am
not signing any form,"'" and then made an inculpatory statement. The state supreme court held that the statement was
inadmissible, because there had been no specific waiver as required by Miranda.The United State Supreme Court disagreed.
While acknowledging that "[an express written or oral statement of waiver.

. .

is usually strong proof of the validity of that

263. 577 S.W.2d at 462,
264. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-227(b) (1977).
265. 577 S.W.2d at 465 (Henry, C.J., dissenting).

266. Id. (Henry, C.J., dissenting).
267.

441 U.S. 369 (1979).

268. Id. at 371.
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waiver,"' it was neither dispositive nor essential. The question
was one of fact, and even the silence of the accused, when
coupled with the surrounding circumstances, could lead to the
conclusion that the accused had effectively waived his rights.'"
F. Right of Confrontation
In 1968 the Supreme Court held in Bruton v. United
States"' that an accused was denied the sixth amendment right
of confrontation when a codefendant's confession, introduced at
a joint trial, implicated him, and the confessing defendant did
not take the stand."7 In Parker v. Randolph""7 the Court in a

plurality opinion' held Bruton inapplicable when the accused
has confessed, and his confession interlocks with that of the codefendant. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the right to crossexamine the confessor "has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence."' In Bruton the Court was
concerned that an instruction to limit the jury's consideration of
a confession to the guilt of the confessor would be inadequate to
safeguard the right of confrontation. Here the Justices concluded that "[tihe possible prejudice resulting from the failure
of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so 'devastating' or 'vital' to the confessing defendant to require departure from the general 27rule
allowing admission of evidence with
6
limiting instructions.

269. Id. at 373.
270. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 377 (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).

271.

391 U.S. 123 (1968).

272. See TRIMAL
273.

RIGHTS, supra

note 245, § 12, at 42-51.

442 U.S. 62 (1979).

274. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and White. Id. at 64. Justice Blackmun, concurring, concluded that

Bruton was applicable, but that any error was harmless. Id. at 77 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
275. Id. at 73.
276. Id. at 74-75.
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G. Fair Trial
1. Presumption of Innocence
The constitutionality of a jury instruction charging that
"[tlhe law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,""' was considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana."' The accused
was charged with deliberate homicide, and the defense sought to
prove that as a result of mental disorder the accused had not
killed the victim deliberately. Over defense objection, the jury
was instructed that the law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, an instruction that
the defense contended shifted the burden of proof on the issue
of purpose or knowledge to the defense, and thereby violated the
due process clause. A conviction of deliberate murder was affirmed by the state supreme court.'79 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Court was concerned that a reasonable jury might have
understood the instruction as a conclusive presumption of intent, or, at least, as a direction to find intent unless the defendant proved the contrary. In In re Winship"" the Court had
held "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."' ' The charge in Sandstrom required proof that the
crime was committed purposely or knowingly. If the challenged
instruction was interpreted as a conclusive presumption, it
would "conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence
with which the law endows the accused and which extends to
every element of the crime.""' If the instruction was interpreted as shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, the
Winship standard would again be violated, because a similar in277. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513 (1979).
278. Id. at 510.
279. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106 (Mont. 1978).

280. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
281. Id. at 364.
282. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522 (quoting Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952)).
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struction was found constitutionally deficient in Mullaney v.
Wilbur.2 8 In Mullaney the jury had been told that if the prosecution established that a homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought could be implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion. Such an instruction was held to
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
light of these decisions, the Court was persuaded that the instruction in the present case was constitutionally unacceptable.
2.

Public Trial

The rarely litigated sixth amendment right to a public trial
was examined by the Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.'" At issue was the independent right of the public to attend a pretrial judicial proceeding when the accused, the prosecution, and the trial judge had all agreed to close the hearing in
the interest of a fair trial. The accused were charged with grand
larceny, robbery, and second degree murder. The victim had
been found shot with his own gun, his body weighted with
anchors and tossed into a lake. Interest was sustained in the
press over a ninety-day period by the inability of police to find
the body, by later confessions of the accused, and by the recovery of the purported murder weapon. The defense, at a pretrial
hearing, sought to suppress tangible evidence and statements
made to the police. Defense attorneys argued that the degree of
adverse publicity had jeopardized the ability of the defendants
to receive a fair trial,'" and they requested that the public and
press be excluded from the hearing. The prosecution did not oppose the motion. The following day a reporter for the petitioner
objected to the exclusion and demanded a transcript of the hearing. The request was denied, and the New York appellate court
sustained the ruling of the trial court."
The Supreme Court affirmed. While the Court could have
limited the ruling and distinguished a pretrial suppression hear283.

421 U.S. 684 (1975).

284. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
285. Id. at 375-77.
286. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
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ing from a trial on the merits, it instead chose to treat the right
to a public trial as applicable to a pretrial hearing and concluded
that the right was created for the benefit of the accused. There
was no comparable right on the part of the public to access to a
criminal trial. While open judicial proceedings were required at
common law, the Court was not persuaded that the common law
rule had been elevated to a constitutional rule by the passage of
the sixth amendment. 7 Moreover, even the common law rule
did not grant access to a pretrial hearing."'8
Finally, assuming that first amendment interests were implicated by the exclusion order, the proper course was that taken
by the trial court: a balancing of the right of access by the press
and public against the right of the accused to a fair trial.' The
Court noted that at the time the closure motion was made by
the accused, no one in the court room, including the reporter for
the petitioner, objected. Nevertheless, counsel for petitioner was
thereafter given an opportunity to be heard. "The trial judge
concluded after making this appraisal that the press and the
public could be excluded from the suppression hearing and
could be denied immediate access to a transcript, because an
open proceeding would pose a 'reasonable probability of
prejudice to these defendants.' ,,s Moreover, the denial of access was only temporary; once the trial court was convinced that
the danger of prejudice had been dissipated, the press and the
public were accorded a full opportunity to scrutinize the transcript of the suppression hearing-""
Justice Blackmun, speaking for four members of the Court,
concurring and dissenting, submitted that the Court previously
had recognized that the sixth amendment implicated interests
beyond those of the accused."'2 In a discussion of the right to a
speedy trial in Barker v. Wingo,'" the Court had observed that
"there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which ex-

287. 443 U.S. at 384-91.
288. Id. at 387-90.
289. Id. at 392-93.
290. Id.

291. Id. at 393.
292. Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
293. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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ists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of
the accused."'" In Singer v. United States'" the Court had rejected the contention of the accused that the right to trial by a
jury implicated an absolute right of the accused to be tried by a
judge alone. In Faretta v. Californias" the Court, while recognizing the right of an accused to forego the assistance of an attorney in the presentation of his defense, found an independent
right of self-representation in the sixth amendment but failed to
make it absolute. Justice Blackmun concluded that in order to
close a hearing, the accused should be required to establish a
substantial probability that (1) "irreparable damage to his fairtrial right will result from conducting the proceeding in public";'" (2) "alternatives to closure will not protect adequately his
right to a fair trial";'" s and (3) "closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm."'"
3.

Jury Instructions

Trial judges in Tennessee are required "to charge the jury
as to all of the law of each offense included in the indictment,
without any request on the part of the defendant to do so.""b"O In
Howard v. State'0 ' the defendant who gained entry to a schoolhouse by throwing a brick through a window subsequently was
indicted for third degree burglary.30 ' The defense requested an
instruction on the offense of criminal trespass, which was refused. The issue on appeal was whether criminal trespass was a
lesser included offense of burglary. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that it was not, and concluded that for the purpose
of jury instruction "an offense is necessarily included in another
if the elements of the greater offense, as those elements are set

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
(1975).

Id. at 519.
380 U.S. 24 (1965).
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
443 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2518 (Supp. 1980).
578 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. 1979).
Id. at 84. Defendant was indicted under TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 39-904
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forth in the indictment, include, but are not congruent with, all
the elements of the lesser [offense].'
Because an element of
the crime of criminal trespass was a breach of the peace, which
was not an element of third degree burglary, the instruction on
the former properly was disallowed. Principal reliance was
placed on Wright v.State,3 " which the majority maintained implicitly adopted the rule only now articulated. Chief Justice
Henry, however, dissenting, contended that the Howard court's
holding was "180 degrees removed from our holding in
s In Wright the court had held that shoplifting was a
Wright. 30
lesser included offense of petit larceny. As in the present case,
all of the elements of the lesser offense would not necessarily be
proven in a conviction. But in Wright, the petit larceny charge
was based upon the removal of goods from a display counter in a
retail department store. The court was persuaded that "it would
be utterly impossible to make out a case of petit larceny of merchandise from a retail mercantile establishment without establishing shoplifting."3' 06 Thus, the dissent in Howard reasoned
that the majority had adopted an evidentiary test, rather than a
statutory test-that is, the evidence used to prove the greater
offense will of necessity prove the lesser one. In Howard the
proof of burglary entailed proof of a criminal trespass, and,
therefore, an instruction on the lesser offense was appropriate.
The confusion as to the holding in Wright results from the
fact that the Wright court said one thing and did another. The
dissent in Howard would appear correct in its insistence that the
results in the two cases are inconsistent. However, in Wright the
court adopted the test set out in Johnson v. State:307 "The true
test of which is a lesser and which is a greater crime is whether
the elements of the former are completely contained within the
latter, so that to prove the greater the State must first prove the
elements of the lesser." 308 This test, taken in isolation, leads to
the result reached by the majority in Howard. The dissent

303.
304.

578 S.W.2d at 85.
549 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1977).

305. 578 S.W.2d at 86 (Henry, C.J., dissenting).
306. 549 S.W.2d at 685.
307. 217 Tenn. 234, 397 S.W.2d 170 (1965).
308. Id. at 243, 397 S.W.2d at 174 (emphasis added).
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placed emphasis on the term "prove" in the quoted passage, but
this simply ignores the portion of the sentence preceding the
comma. On the other hand, placing emphasis on the elements
portion of the test is not incompatible with the latter portion-if
the elements are subsumed, then proof of the greater offense will
prove the lesser one as well. The choice is thus clear: if the majority in Howard is correct as to the test, the result in Wright
was wrong. If, however, the dissent is correct, then the statement
of the test taken from Johnson is inaccurate. Support for the
conclusion reached by the dissent can also be found in Spencer
v. State,'0 in which joyriding" was held to be a lesser included
offense of larceny.
H.

Punishment

1. Ex post facto
The prohibition against ex post facto laws in the United
States8 ' and Tennessees'' Constitutions bars the imposition of
punishment that is greater than that provided by law at the
time the offense occurred."' Notwithstanding the near identity
of language in the two provisions, Miller v. State'" illustrates
the increasing frequency with which state courts have imposed
more stringent constitutional standards in criminal prosecutions
than those standards that are federally mandated." 6 At the
time the accused committed the homicide for which he was
convicted of first degree murder, the crime was punishable by a
mandatory death penalty. A few months thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court held the mandatory death penalty
unconstitutional in cases from North Carolina""' and Louisi309. 501 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1973).
310. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-504 (1961) (current version at TENN.
ANN. § 55-5-104 (1980)).
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
312. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 11.

CODE

313. The landmark decision on the meaning of the ex post facto clause is
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 648 (1798).
314. 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979).
315. See generally Daughtrey, State Court Activism and Other Symptoms of the New Federalism, 45 TENN. L. Rzv. 731 (1978).
316. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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ana.3 7 In response to these decisions the Supreme Court of Tennessee declared the state mandatory death penalty unconstitutional in Collins v. State." A discretionary death penalty
statute, presumably in compliance with federal constitutional
standards, was enacted thereafter " ' and was in effect at the
time of the trial in the present case. The accused was convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the
court affirmed the finding of guilt but reduced the sentence to
life imprisonment, and held that because the death penalty statute in effect at the time the crime occurred was void, the only
valid punishment for first degree murder was life imprisonment;
to apply the later enacted death penalty provision to the case
would violate the state constitutional prohibition against ex post
20
facto laws.

This conclusion would appear quite logical and would give
little cause for dispute were it not for the fact that the United
States Supreme Court had reached the opposite conclusion in a
materially indistinguishable case. This led Justice Harbison,
joined by Justice Fones, to dissent in Collins. In Dobbert v.
Florida,"' the Supreme Court had held that the federal ex post
facto clause did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty, because the net effect of the change in the law from the
time of the offense until the imposition of punishment was ameliorative-a mandatory death penalty was eliminated and was
replaced by one with substantial procedural requirements that
reduced the likelihood that the death penalty would be imposed.
Insofar as the argument that no death penalty was in effect at
the time of the crime, the Court responded that for purposes of
the ex post facto clause, the important point was that the accused was on notice that the death penalty attached to convictions for first degree murder."' Justice Harbison maintained
317.
318.
319.
320.

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).
TENN. COns ANN. §§ 39-2402, -2404, -2406 (Supp. 1980).
584 S.W,2d at 762.

321. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
322. Id. at 297-98. Presumably, this argument would hold true only for
cases involving punishment and not for cases in which the statute defining the
offense is declared unconstitutional, but another statute, validly prohibiting
the conduct of the accused, is enacted prior to trial. Justice Stevens, however,
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that the majority in Miller had adopted the position of the dissenters in Dobbert, avoiding any need for reconciliation on the
ground that it was interpreting the state constitution. But, he
continued, the state constitution had "neither been cited,
briefed nor argued in this case, ' "

and it therefore was inappro-

priate for the court sua sponte to conclude that the ex post facto
clauses in the two constitutions led to contradictory results.
2. Death Penalty
Notwithstanding the readiness of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee to impose a different standard for the prohibition of
ex post facto law under the state constitution than that mandated under the federal constitution,"1' in Cozzolino v. State"'
the court held that the same standard would be applied insofar
as the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment were
concerned. Under these provisions 8 "6the death penalty was not
invalid.
A second issue raised in Cozzolino was the introduction by
the prosecution of evidence that the accused had committed
crimes subsequent to the murder with which he was charged.
The prosecution maintained that such evidence properly was
considered by the trial court given the statutory proviso that
"evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court
deems relevant to the punishment.""11 7 The court concluded that

the statute should not be read with such literalism since the
purpose of the statute was to permit the jury to determine if
there were aggravating or mitigating factors to be considered regarding the appropriate punishment. Evidence that did not
speak to these considerations was irrelevant. The case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing.3 8
dissenting in Dobbert, maintained that the reasoning of the majority could lead
to such a result. Id. at 310 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. 584 S.W.2d at 763 (Harbison, J., dissenting).
324. See text accompanying note 315 supra.
325.

584 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979).

326. U.S. CoNs-r, amend. 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
327. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-2404(c) (Supp. 1980).
328. Justice Harbison dissented on the ground that there were no mitigating circumstances proven that would warrant the court's abrogating the im-
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Habitual Criminality

The habitual criminal statute 2 ' authorizes punishment of
life imprisonment for persons previously convicted of the felonies defined in the statute. Petit larceny expressly is excluded
from the specified offenses. In Smith v.State330 the court considered first whether receiving stolen property under the value
of $100 (which in the case of the theft would be only petit larceny) was excluded from the prescribed offenses and, second,
whether petit larceny could in any event be the triggering offense for charging habitual criminality. As to the first question,
notwithstanding the fact that receiving the fruits of petit larceny
would not appear more serious than petit larceny and was punishable by statute as petit larceny, the court saw no choice but
to read the statute literally: the legislature had made only one
exception.3 ' As to the second question, the court noted that
petit larceny had not been excluded from the statutes defining
the circumstances under which an habitual criminal charge
could be brought. 33
An accused charged under the habitual criminal statute "is
entitled to be apprised of the accurate dates of the prior convictions which the state intends to rely on for enhanced punishIn Reed v. State3 4 the court held that the
ment purposes."'
failure to do so required a vacation of the enhanced punishment.
The more interesting point in Reed, and the point upon which
the court divided, was whether the double jeopardy clause precluded retrial on the habitual criminal charge. The majority held
that it did, relying on Burks v.United States3 ' which held that
the double jeopardy clause barred a retrial following a reversal
on grounds of insufficient evidence. Upon petition to rehear on
this issue, the prosecution argued that if an accused is found not

position of the death penalty. 584 S.W.2d at 770 (Harbison, J., dissenting).

329.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-2801 to -2807 (1975).

330. 584 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1979),
331. See Evans v. State, 571 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tenn. 1978).
332. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2802, -2803 (1975).
333. Reed v. State, 581 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert.
denied, id. (Tenn. 1979).

334. Id. at 149:
335. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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guilty under the habitual criminal statute on one occasion, the
same convictions may nevertheless be used to charge under the
statute on a later occasion. The court conceded that it had so
held in cases in which the second trial was for a different offense,"" but the present case was distinguishable. Two cases
were cited by the prosecution from other jurisdictions in which
the same triggering offense had been used in both trials.3 7 The
court responded that such results could not survive Burks.
Judge Dwyer, dissenting, maintained that the bifurcated proceedings on punishment enhancement had nothing to do with
the determination of guilt, and therefore Burks was inapposite.3"'
I

Double Jeopardy

1. Identity of Offenses
The protection against double jeopardy precludes conviction
for both an offense and a lesser included offense based on the
same facts.33 ' Relying upon a recent United States Supreme
4
Court decision, 40 the Tennessee court held in Briggs v. State 3
that an accused cannot be convicted of felony murder 4' and the
4
underlying felony.1 '
2.

Successive Federal-State Prosecutions

The Supreme Court has consistently held that a single crim-

336. 581 S.W.2d at 150 (opinion on petition to rehear) (citing Pearson v.
State, 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1975); Glasscock v. State, 570 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1978)).
337. 581 S.W.2d at 150 (opinion on petition to rehear) (citing Davis v.
Bennett, 400 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 980 (1969);

Branch v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. Tex. 1973)).
338. 581 S.W.2d at 151 (Dwyer, J., dissenting).
339. J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
RIGHTS § 65 (1976).

ACCUSED-PosT-TRIAL

340. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
341.

573 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1978).

342. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (Supp. 1980).
343. The prosecution was based on an earlier version of the statute, but
the reasoning is equally applicable to the present form. Compare TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2402 (1975) with T1NN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (Supp. 1980).
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inal act may be subject to prosecution in both federal and state
courts without offending the protection against double jeopardy. 34 ' While the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged this
rule in Lavon v. State,"' the issue was raised whether a different result should be reached under the state constitution;"40 alternatively, the issue was whether some judicially fashioned limitation should be imposed on successive prosecutions. The
accused had pleaded guilty to a federal charge of bank robbery
and thereafter was indicted for the same crime under state law.
As to the first possibility, the court saw no reason to depart from
prior decisions interpreting the state double jeopardy clause in
accordance with the federal standard.3 47 The court was more
hesitant as to the second argument, confessing to "grave doubts
as to the inherent fairness of any procedure that forces an individual to defend himself against multiple prosecutions for the
same crime. ' '" 8 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the price
of departing from precedent exceeded the benefit thus derived,
quoting Justice Holmes' admonition for prudence in such matters.3 49 Justice Brock, joined by Chief Justice Henry, dissented,
maintaining that the state constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy should be construed to prohibit such duplicative prosecutions. 8 0

See J. COOK, supra note 339, § 74.
586 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1979),
346. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
347. See State v. Rhodes, 146 Tenn. 398, 242 S.W. 642 (1922); Beard v.
State, 485 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
348. 586 S.W.2d at 114.
349. Stack v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 177 Mass. 155, 158, 58 N.E.
686, 687 (1900).
344.
345.

350. 586 S.W.2d at 116 (Henry, C.J., and Brock, J., dissenting).

